During the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, emerging market economies (EMEs) loosened monetary policy considerably to cushion the shock. In previous crises episodes, by contrast, EMEs generally had to tighten monetary policy to defend the value of their currencies, to contain capital flight, and to bolster policy credibility. Our study aims to understand the factors that enabled this remarkable shift in monetary policy, and also to assess whether this marks a new era in which EMEs can now conduct countercyclical policy, more in line with advanced economies. The results indicate statistically significant linkages between some characteristics of the economies and their ability to conduct countercyclical monetary policy. We find that macroeconomic fundamentals and lower vulnerabilities, openness to trade, and international capital flows, financial reforms, and the adoption of inflation targeting all facilitated the conduct of countercyclical policy. Of these factors, the most important have been the financial reforms achieved over the past decades and the adoption of inflation targeting. As long as EMEs maintain these strong economic fundamentals, continue to reform their financial sector, and adopt credible and transparent monetary policy frameworks such as inflation targeting, the conduct of countercyclical monetary policy will likely be sustainable.
Introduction
During the …nancial crisis of [2008] [2009] , emerging market economies (EMEs) loosened monetary policy considerably to cushion against the global …nancial shock and to foster economic recovery. This is a remarkable departure from previous crisis episodes during which EMEs generally had to raise interest rates in order to bolster the credibility of monetary policy, to defend the value of their currencies, and to contain capital ‡ight. Our study asks what factors enabled this shift in monetary policy of EMEs, and it assesses whether this shift marks a new era in which EMEs can pursue countercyclical monetary policy like their counterparts in advanced economies.
Macroeconomic policies-both …scal and monetary-tend to be countercyclical in advanced economies.
In EMEs, by contrast, these policies tend to be procyclical or, at best, acyclical that tend to be countercyclical. This feature of monetary and …scal policy deprived EMEs of important macroeconomic stabilization tools, and might partly explain the higher volatility of output in EMEs compared with the advanced economies documented in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and others.
One way to reduce output volatility and enhance welfare in EMEs is to understand the factors that prevented policymakers in EMEs from conducting countercyclical policy in the past, and to devise policies to help them use …scal and monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilization.
Studies have analyzed the factors driving the cyclicality in the …scal policy of EMEs. See for example, Gavin and Perotti (1997) , Talvi and Vegh (2004) , and others. 1 By contrast, there are few empirical studies of the cyclicality in the monetary policy in EMEs. This sparsity likely re ‡ects the di¢ culty of …nding common monetary policy instruments over time and across countries, as these instruments depend importantly on the exchange rate regime. Even with common instruments, characterizing the monetary policy stance is di¢ cult.
In Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) examines cyclicality in the monetary policy of a broad set of countries covering both emerging market and advanced economies by relying primarily on short-term interest rates. Assuming imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign assets, short-term interest rates can represent common monetary policy instruments under both ‡exible and predetermined exchange rate regimes. Using these short-term interest rates, Kaminsky et al. (2004) estimate a Taylor rule policy function for each country and …nd that monetary policy is generally countercyclical in advanced economies. By contrast, it tends to be procyclical in EMEs.
ducting countercyclical monetary policy. These factors were explored in Calderon et al. (2003) for a set of eleven EMEs. They …nd that the ability of these EMEs to conduct both countercyclical …scal and monetary policies is determined by the credibility of their policies.
Our study adds to this sparse literature by examining the behavior of monetary policy during economic crises. Economic crises are costly in output and welfare losses. Optimal response to crises generally require countercyclical policies to cushion the shock and to foster economic recovery. Yet in EMEs, the crises are exacerbated by procyclical policies, including monetary policy. However, during the 2008-2009 global …nancial crisis, central banks in EMEs were able to loosen monetary policy considerably, perhaps signaling that monetary policy has evolved in these countries. To our knowledge, this is the …rst study to comprehensively assess the factors that Our estimation strategy uses a Logit regression model to examine the factors that have facilitated the conduct of countercyclical monetary policy in EMEs. The results indicate statistically signi…cant linkages between some characteristics of the economies and policymakers'ability to conduct countercyclical monetary policy. We …nd that while stronger macroeconomic fundamentals, reduced vulnerabilities, greater openness to trade and international capital ‡ows facilitated the conduct of countercyclical policy, the most important determinants have been the …nancial reforms achieved over the past decades and the adoption of in ‡ation targeting. In ‡ation targeting regimes, which are becoming more pervasive among EMEs, enhance greater policy transparency and ‡exibil-ity of monetary policy. EMEs also achieve greater policy credibility by adopting in ‡ation targeting regimes and by achieving greater …nancial reforms. As long as EMEs maintain strong economic fundamentals, continue to reform their …nancial markets, and adopt credible and transparent mon-2 etary policy frameworks such as in ‡ation targeting, the conduct of countercyclical policy as an economic stabilization tool might be sustainable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we discuss some of the literature on the determinants of monetary policy stance in EMEs. Sections 4 and 5 describe the econometric strategy, the data, and the results. Section 5 is devoted to caveats and robustness analyses, and we o¤er concluding remarks in Section 6.
Determinants of Monetary Policy in Emerging Market Economies During Crises
During economic crises the common policy prescription is to loosen monetary policy in order to support domestic economic activity. This prescription is theoretically motivated by the Keynesian models and illustrated in practice by the Taylor rule type of approach to monetary policy. In this setting, looser monetary policy is necessary to help close the negative output gap and restore full employment. The consequent increase in domestic liquidity tempers the e¤ect of the contraction in external credit that usually occurs during EMEs'crises. Advanced economies have generally followed this practice. In EMEs, however, other factors have prevented the conduct of countercyclical policy or made countercyclical policy undesirable.
Conditional on speci…c economic vulnerabilities, countercyclical policy might not be optimal.
For example, if a country has a large fraction of its debt that is short term and denominated in foreign currency, the adverse balance sheet e¤ects of an exchange rate depreciation induced by a countercyclical policy could more than o¤set any potential costs of a procyclical policy. In this case, it would be optimal to maintain a procyclical monetary policy. Internal vulnerabilities such as these or other institutional de…ciencies explain the inability or undesirability of policymakers in EMEs to conduct countercyclical policy. And authorities in these countries have often been more concerned about bolstering the credibility of policy, containing capital ‡ight, and defending the values of their currencies.
A study by Calderon et al. (2003) of the cyclicality of monetary policy in some EMEs, …nds that credibility of policy was the determining factor. As pointed out by Lane (2003) , when the monetary authority lacks credibility, a temporary loosening of monetary policy is perceived as heralding a persistent switch to a loose money regime with adverse e¤ects on con…dence and increases in risk 3 premiums demanded by foreign investors. 2 We include in our study some variables that capture the strength of institutions and the credibility of policy: the exchange rate regime, an indicator for in ‡ation targeting, a measure of …nancial reforms-the extent to which authorities have allowed market forces to determine outcomes in credit and …nancial markets-, and a measure of …nancial development.
In addition to measuring strength of institutions and the credibility of policy, the …nancial development variable has a unique relevance. Financial development enables a more e¢ cient transmission of monetary policy and, hence, increases the incentives to conduct countercyclical policy. Also, the development of …nancial markets has traditionally promoted more borrowing on domestic markets and in local currencies. A higher share of local currency debt reduces risks of capital ‡ight, and risks of currency and maturity mismatches. As such, development of domestic …nancial markets facilitates the conduct of countercyclical policy. Devereux and Lane (2003) …nds that countries with a greater dependence on foreign currency debt are more likely to tailor policy to minimize exchange rate volatility with the creditor country.
Besides restricting monetary policy, dependence on external debt and debt with shorter maturities has a¤ected the perceived solvency of EMEs during crises. With this consideration in mind, we include variables on external debt and its maturity structure and variables on the country's …nances such as foreign exchange reserves and central government debt.
We also consider other macroeconomic fundamentals such as current account balances and in ‡ation. A low in ‡ation environment facilitates the loosening of monetary policy, consistent with the prescriptions from a Taylor rule function. In ‡ation could also capture the independence of the central bank and, hence, credibility of monetary policy. Several studies document that central banks in lower-in ‡ation countries are more independent (see for example, Alesina and Summers, 1993) ; and central bank independence improves the e¢ ciency of monetary policy (Mishkin, 2010) .
Economic integration is also an important factor. A study by Yakhin (2008) …nds that under …nancial integration, the optimal monetary policy is countercyclical, but procyclical under autarky.
These results suggest an important role for openness. We include a measure of …nancial openness, and also trade openness.
In sum, the variables we explore in this study can be classi…ed into four categories: Macroeco-2 See also Caballero (2002), Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Mendoza (2002 
Econometric Speci…cation and Data Description
We estimate the following Logit model using the indicator variable for countercyclical monetary policy during crises as the dependent variable: 6 not (the thin line). Several of these key variables highlight the di¤erence between the two sets of countries. Those that loosened monetary policy had better macroeconomic fundamentals and lower vulnerabilities: in ‡ation was lower on the eve of the crisis; current account balances were in large surplus while those of countries that could not lower rates were in de…cit; reserves as percent of GDP were higher, and central government debt as percent of GDP was lower. Also, compared with countries that could not lower rates, those that did had external debt with slightly longer maturities, and lower short-term debt as percent of reserves. They were also more open to trade and international capital ‡ows, had relatively more ‡exible exchange rate regimes, and were more likely to be in ‡ation targeters. Finally, countries that lowered monetary policy had more developed …nancial markets and had made more progress on …nancial reforms.
To facilitate interpretation of our regression results, we transform all of the continuous variables into categorical variables: top quartile, midquartiles, and bottom quartile. This transformation also allows for the exploration of nonlineraties and to control for the e¤ect of potential outliers.
Estimation and Results

Univariate Analysis
The regression results for the univariate analysis (each regression has only one explanatory variable) are shown in Table 2 . Columns 2, 3, and 4 show the logit coe¢ cients, p-values, and odds ratios, respectively.
Macroeconomic Fundamentals and Vulnerability:
These results suggest that strong macroeconomic fundamentals and reduced vulnerability in the pre-crisis year increased the chances of conducting countercyclical monetary policy. A country with pre-crisis in ‡ation in the top quartile of the distribution has lower odds of reducing rates during the crisis. Similarly, countries with the lowest government debt and highest current account surplus (in the top quartiles) were, respectively, about 2.3 and 3.5 times more likely to conduct countercyclical policy. The coe¢ cients for the share of short-term external debt, foreign exchange reserves as percent of GDP, and short-term debt as percent of foreign exchange reserves have the expected sign, but they are not statistically signi…cant.
Openness: The next set of results indicates an important role for openness in a country's ability to conduct countercyclical monetary policy. Countries with highly open capital accounts (top quartile of the distribution) were 3 times more likely to loosen monetary policy during the likely to loosen monetary policy.
Exchange Rate Regime and Policy Credibility: The coe¢ cient for the exchange rate regime has the expected sign; countries with the most ‡exible form of exchange rate regime are more likely to loosen monetary policy but the coe¢ cient is not statistically signi…cant. The results for in ‡ation targeting, which also proxies for transparency and credibility of the central bank, are very strong. A country with an in ‡ation targeting regime was about 7.6 times more likely to conduct countercyclical monetary policy than a country without one.
Financial Development and Financial Reforms: The result for …nancial reform is also very strong. It suggests that a country with the highest level of …nancial reform was 4.5 times more likely to loosen monetary policy. For …nancial development, the positive coe¢ cient has the expected sign though it is not statistically signi…cant.
We suspect that these variables are not necessarily independent of each other. In the next analysis, we estimate the e¤ect of these various factors in a multivariate econometric framework.
Multivariate Analysis
Tables 3 presents the odds ratios obtained from the multivariate regression using equation (1). We 
Identi…cation of Crises and Monetary Policy Stance
Two variables that are central to our study are indicators for crises and the monetary policy stance.
We follow Frankel and Rose (1996) and de…ne a crisis year as one in which the bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate depreciated at least 25 percent, with the rate of depreciation exceeding the previous year's depreciation by at least 10 percentage points. 6 In addition, we include periods with negative or zero real gross domestic product (GDP) growth in order to capture episodes of economic stress that necessitate active countercyclical monetary policy, but when exchange rate movements might not be substantial. At the outset, we obtain 1,462 episodes between 1970 and 2009. Identifying the monetary policy stance is more complicated, primarily due to the lack of a common monetary policy instrument across countries and time. In particular, the policy instrument depends on the exchange rate regime. We follow Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) and use short-term interest rates as the policy instrument. Under ‡exible exchange rate regimes, short- 6 We also explored two alternative de…nitions provided by Milesi-Ferretti, Gian, and Razin (2008) .
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term interest rates characterize monetary policy since changes in money supply in ‡uences these rates. However, under predetermined exchange rate regimes, short-term rates are valid monetary policy instruments only if we assume imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign assets.
See, for example, Flood and Jeanne (2000) or Lahiri and Vegh (2003) . For the choice of short-term rates, we begin with the monetary policy rates, and supplement with the discount or interbank rates. When these series are not available, we rely on short-term Treasury bill rates, and then money market rates.
In addition to short-term interest rates, we also use growth of central banks' domestic credit to proxy for monetary policy. Under ‡exible exchange rate regimes, central bank domestic credit growth a¤ects the monetary base and short-term rates. Under predetermined exchange rate regimes and perfect substitution between domestic and foreign assets, growth in central bank credit will be o¤set by an opposite e¤ect in foreign exchange reserves. However, if domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes, an increase in central bank credit will have some e¤ect on the monetary base and short-term interest rates.
Even with good measures of the monetary policy instrument, characterizing the monetary policy stance is not obvious. For the purpose of this study, we de…ne countercyclical policy as a movement in the direction of loosening monetary policy during periods of economic stress. We de…ne a binary indicator variable that takes a value of one if: the policy rate declines in the year of the crisis relative to the previous year or when the central bank's domestic credit growth in the crisis year exceeds that of the previous year and the average rate of the three years prior to the crisis. When the monetary policy rate is not available, we rely on other short-term rates.
We are mindful of the potential imperfections associated with the use of other short-term interest rates to as a measure of monetary policy. Short-term rates can change independent of the true monetary policy rate. For example, risk premia tend to increase during crises, causing some shortterm rates to rise even if policy rates have been lowered. However, in periods of crises, we posit that a decline in short-term rates likely indicates lower monetary policy rates. At the outset, we obtain the policy stance for 980 crisis years, 127 for the advanced economies and 853 for EMEs. 
Econometric Speci…cation and Data Description
The econometric model is a more general version of equation (1) used in the previous section.
Where
; X i; 1 represents a set of explanatory variables that capture a country's ability to conduct countercyclical monetary policy during crises and are measured in the year before the crisis ( 1) for each crisis country i. The set of independent variables (X) are as de…ned in the previous section, but measured with a lag. Summary statistics for the independent variables over the 1970-2009 sample period are described in Table 1 . Table 2 .
Estimation and Results
Univariate Analysis
Macroeconomic Fundamentals and Vulnerability: Strong macroeconomic fundamentals and reduced vulnerability increase the chances of conducting countercyclical monetary policy. A country with pre-crisis in ‡ation in the bottom quartile of the distribution is 62 percent more likely to reduce rates during the crisis. Similarly, countries with the largest amount of foreign exchange reserves (in the top quartile) are about 2.5 times more likely to conduct countercyclical policy. Those with the highest levels of short-term external debt to foreign exchange reserves ratio are less likely to conduct countercyclical policy during crises. The coe¢ cients on the share of short-term external debt, current account surpluses, and government debt have the expected sign but are not statistically signi…cant.
Openness: The next set of results examine the role of openness. Overall, they suggest an important role for openness in a country's ability to conduct countercyclical monetary policy.
Countries with highly open capital accounts (top quartile of the distribution) are 45 percent more likely to loosen monetary policy during crises. Similarly, those most closed to trade are about 40 percent less likely to loosen monetary policy.
Exchange Rate Regime and Policy Credibility: The coe¢ cient for the exchange rate regime has the expected sign; countries with the most ‡exible form of exchange rate regime are more likely to loosen monetary policy but the coe¢ cient is not statistically signi…cant. Again, the results for in ‡ation targeting, which also proxies for transparency and credibility of the central bank, are the strongest. They suggest that a country with in ‡ation targeting is nearly 7 times more likely to conduct countercyclical monetary policy than a country without an in ‡ation targeting regime.
Financial Development and Financial Reforms: Both …nancial development and reforms enhance the ability to conduct countercyclical monetary policy. Countries that have achieved the highest level of …nancial reforms are more than twice as likely to loosen monetary policy, and those with the most developed …nancial system are 50 percent more likely to loosen monetary policy.
In sum, these results suggest strong linkages between a country's ability to conduct monetary policy and its macroeconomic fundamentals and vulnerability, its degree of openness, the exchange rate regime and the credibility of the central bank's policy, as well as the degree of …nancial development and reforms. Judging by the size of the coe¢ cients, in ‡ation targeting appears to be the most important determinant of the ability to conduct countercyclical monetary policy, followed by a high level of …nancial reforms, large amounts of foreign exchange reserves, and low in ‡ation. Table 5 presents the odds ratios obtained from the multivariate regression using equation (2).
Multivariate Analysis
We estimate the model with OxMetrics. It explored 450 models (combinations of regressors), and selected, based on the Akaike Information Criterion, the 12 comparable alternative models reported in columns 1 through 12 of the table.
Macroeconomic Fundamentals and Vulnerability: As found previously, stronger macroeconomic fundamentals and low vulnerability enhance the odds of countercyclical monetary policy. Countries with the lowest pre-crisis rate of in ‡ation are more than twice as likely to lower interest rates during crises. These results are consistent with the prediction from a Taylor rule reaction function.
Indeed, in a low in ‡ation environment, monetary authorities can loosen monetary policy to stimulate economic activity without concerns of fueling in ‡ation. We …nd evidence that higher foreign exchange reserves as a percent of GDP enhance the odds of conducting countercyclical monetary policy. Having foreign exchange reserves to cover the external short-term debt is a robust indicator of a country's ability to conduct countercyclical monetary policy. Countries in the lowest quartile of the short-term debt to foreign exchange reserves distribution are roughly twice as likely to conduct countercyclical monetary policy, and the e¤ect appears to be monotonic. The extent to which a country can cover its short-term debt is indeed an important indicator of its solvency in periods of crises when the rollover of debt or issuance of new debt becomes di¢ cult. 
Openness
Caveats and Robustness Analysis
In this section, we conduct robustness analysis to assess the importance of some of the assumptions we have made and discuss some possible caveats.
During the analysis, as in Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) , we assume that under imperfect substitution between foreign and domestic assets, short-term interest rates are good monetary policy instruments under predetermined exchange rate regimes. To assess how this assumption a¤ects our results, we restrict the sample to non-pegged exchange rate regimes in the …rst robustness test.
The second test, we restrict the measurement of monetary policy to policy rates and discount rates only-the two most reliable measures-in order to control for the e¤ect of potential imperfections in 13 other measures of monetary policy. In the third robustness test, we remove from the sample crises episodes during which policy was acyclical-when interest rates did not change between the pre-crisis year and crisis year. In the last robustness test, we remove from the sample the second of any two crises that occur in consecutive years for the same country to ensure that our results are not driven by a possible doublecounting of the same crisis. The results for these robustness analyses are presented in Table 6 , column 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Our main results, highlighting the importance of …nancial reforms and in ‡ation targeting regimes on a country's ability to conduct countercyclical monetary policy, still hold.
One caveat is whether nominal interest rates (not real interest rates) are the appropriate measure of monetary policy stance. We are unable to measure in ‡ation expectations and formally conduct this robustness analysis. Our study is more concerned with the direction of monetary policy from the standpoint of the central bank and not with the actual policy stance. As such, the use of nominal interest rates is appropriate.
Another caveat pertains to the other nonconventional monetary policy instruments that EMEs often use. In advanced economies with well-functioning …nancial markets, the main monetary policy instrument consists of open market operations and, to a lesser extent, adjustments to the discount rate and reserve requirement ratios. In EMEs, where …nancial markets are underdeveloped, monetary policy use other nonconventional instruments such as credit ceilings, and moral suasion. Although this study does not take into account all of the measures of monetary policy, we believe that if data were available, changes in these instruments would generally be consistent with the changes in short-term rates. For example, it is not likely that the central bank will lower short-term interest rates and at the same time raise reserve requirements or lower the credit ceilings.
We further assured that our main results are robust to a number of the caveats mentioned 
Concluding Remarks
During the recent global …nancial crisis, a large number of EMEs loosened monetary policy to cushion the e¤ect of the global …nancial crisis. This was a remarkable departure from previous crisis episodes during which EMEs had to tighten monetary policy. In this study, we explored the factors that enabled this shift in policy stance and …nd statistically signi…cant linkages between some characteristics of the economies and their ability to conduct countercyclical monetary policy.
The results indicate that stronger macroeconomic fundamentals and reduced vulnerabilities, greater openness to trade and …nancial ‡ows, …nancial reforms and the adoption of in ‡ation targeting all facilitated the conduct of countercyclical policy in EMEs. Of these factors, …nancial reforms and in ‡ation targeting stand out as the most important. Several EMEs adopted in ‡ation targeting since the late 1990s and, over the past decades, EMEs have also reformed their …nancial sectors. In ‡ation targeting regimes enhance transparency and ‡exibility of monetary policy.
By adopting in ‡ation targeting and by implementing …nancial reforms, EMEs also achieved a greater policy credibility. Indeed, lack of policy credibility is one of the main impediments to
EMEs'ability to conduct countercyclical monetary policy. When credibility is fragile, an attempt by the central bank to loosen monetary policy is perceived as a permanent switch to a loose money regime. This perception adversely a¤ects con…dence and increases risk premiums demanded by foreign investors. The adoption of in ‡ation targeting helps to dispel these perceptions, as it fosters con…dence in monetary policy and anchors in ‡ation expectations. Moreover, in ‡ation targeting has been accompanied by reduced emphasis on exchange rate management, thereby allowing monetary policy to be ‡exibly geared toward the stabilization of the domestic economy.
We interpret our results to suggest that as long as EMEs maintain strong economic fundamentals, continue to reform their …nancial markets, and adopt ‡exible and transparent monetary policy frameworks such as in ‡ation targeting, the conduct of countercyclical policy as an economic stabilization tool will likely be sustainable. The increasing popularity of in ‡ation targeting among
EMEs is particularly encouraging in this regard. We are not aware of a country that has adopted in ‡ation targeting and abandoned it out of dissatisfaction, and there appears to be a degree of 15 irreversibility in …nancial reforms, suggesting that the conduct of countercyclical policy could be sustainable.
The increasing ability of EMEs to use monetary policy as a macroeconomic stabilization tool might partly explain the greater resilience of these economies to shocks emanating from the advanced economies despite increasing integration between the two sets of countries. . 2 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Mean Inflation Targeting -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 non CCMP CCMP Median Financial Development . 1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 non CCMP CCMP Median Financial Reform 
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